Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice by Ehlers, Lars & Weymark, John A.
  
CANDIDATE
NONBINARY
JCAHIER 26-2001 
 
 
 STABILITY AND 
 SOCIAL CHOICE 
 
 
Lars EHLERS and 
ohn A. WEYMARK 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CAHIER 26-2001 
 
 
CANDIDATE STABILITY AND NONBINARY SOCIAL CHOICE 
 
 
Lars EHLERS1 and John A. WEYMARK2 
 
 
1 Centre de recherche et développement en économique (C.R.D.E.) and Département de 
sciences économiques, Université de Montréal 
 
2 Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________ 
 
Parts of this article were previously circulated in somewhat different form in a working paper with the 
same title by the second author. The authors are grateful to Michel Le Breton for his comments. 
  
 
 
 
RÉSUMÉ 
 
 Une des propriétés désirables d’une procédure de vote est qu’elle doit être 
exempte de retrait stratégique d’un candidat à l’élection. Duttu, Jackson et Le Breton 
(Econometrica, 2001) ont établi des théorèmes démontrant que cette propriété est 
incompatible avec certaines propriétés désirables de procédures de vote. Cet article 
montre que la généralisation non binaire du théorème d’Arrow par Grether et Plott peut 
être utilisée pour faire une démonstration assez simple de deux de ces théorèmes 
d’impossibilité. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic 
withdrawal of a candidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 
2001) have established a number of theorems that demonstrate that this condition is 
incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article 
shows that Grether and Plott's nonbinary generalization of Arrow's Theorem can be 
used to provide simple proofs of two of these impossibility theorems. 
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1. Introduction
A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strate-
gic withdrawal of a candidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton
[3] have recently established a number of theorems which demonstrate that
this condition is incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting
procedures. In this article, we show that Grether and Plott’s [5] nonbinary
generalization of Arrow’s [1] Theorem can be used to provide relatively simple
proofs of two of Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton’s impossibility theorems.
For any proﬁle of linear voter preferences, a voting rule determines a win-
ning candidate from any subset of candidates drawn from a ﬁxed list of po-
tential candidates based on the preferences of the voters over the candidates
running for oﬃce. A voting procedure is candidate stable if no candidate
would prefer to withdraw from an election when all of the other potential
candidates enter. In other words, it is a Nash equilibrium for all potential
candidates to stand for election. When there is no overlap between the candi-
dates and voters, Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton restrict attention to voting
rules that respect unanimity in the sense that a candidate who is ranked
ﬁrst among the candidates on the ballot by all of the voters is elected. Their
candidate stability theorem for the no overlap case shows that unanimity and
candidate stability jointly imply that a single voter determines the outcome
in any election in which all or all but one of the potential candidates is on
the ballot.1
Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton also consider a stronger version of their
candidate stability axiom. A voting procedure is strongly candidate stable if
the election outcome is unaﬀected when a candidate withdraws who would
lose if every candidate enters the election. When there is no overlap between
candidates and voters, the two candidate stability conditions are equivalent,
at least when candidates rank themselves ﬁrst, which is what Dutta, Jackson,
and Le Breton assume. In their strong candidate stability theorem, candi-
dates can also be voters. Because candidates are assumed to rank themselves
ﬁrst, the unanimity condition is strengthened to require that a candidate is
chosen if he or she is the top-ranked candidate on the ballot by all voters once
the self-preferences of non-elected voting candidates is ignored. Dutta, Jack-
1When candidates are permitted to vote, Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton have shown
that candidate stability is incompatible with a weak unanimity condition that is consistent
with a candidate ranking him- or herself ﬁrst and a monotonicity condition that is satisﬁed
by many common voting procedures. We do not consider this result here.
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son, and Le Breton’s strong candidate stability theorem shows that when this
unanimity condition is combined with strong candidate stability, the voting
rule must be dictatorial in the sense described above.
Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton do not prove their candidate stability the-
orem for the no overlap case directly; they instead show that it is a corollary
to their strong candidate stability theorem. Their proof of the latter result
is quite long and complicated. Although, as Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton
[3, p. 1021] note, ‘the logic of Arrow’s theorem cannot be directly applied’
to prove their results, they nevertheless are able to use Wilson’s [7] gener-
alization of Arrow’s Theorem at a key step in their argument. The proofs
provided here demonstrate that the incompatibility of Dutta, Jackson, and
Le Breton’s axioms in the two theorems described above follows fairly directly
from a restricted-domain version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
In Section 2, we present Grether and Plott’s Theorem. Dutta, Jackson,
and Le Breton’s theorems are described in Section 3. Our proofs of the
candidate stability and strong candidate stability theorems follow in Sections
4 and 5, respectively. In Section 6, we relate our analysis to the recent
articles on multivalued voting procedures by Eraslan and McLennan [4] and
Rodr´ıguez-A´lvarez [6].
2. The Grether-Plott theorem
Let N = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 2 be a ﬁnite set of individuals and X =
{x1, . . . , xm} with m ≥ 3 be a ﬁnite set of alternatives. An agenda is a
nonempty subset of X. An ordering of X is a reﬂexive, complete, and tran-
sitive binary relation on X. The corresponding strict preference relation
P and indiﬀerence relation I are deﬁned as follows: For all x, y ∈ X, (a)
xPy ↔ xRy and ¬(yRx) and (b) xIy ↔ xRy and yRx. A linear ordering
of X is an antisymmetric ordering; i.e., an ordering for which no two dis-
tinct alternatives are indiﬀerent. Let R denote the set of all orderings and
L denote the set of all linear orderings of X.
Each individual i ∈ N has a preference ordering Ri ∈ R of X. A pref-
erence proﬁle R = (R1, . . . , Rn) is an n-tuple of individual preference order-
ings. Two preferences R1, R2 ∈ R coincide on A ⊆ X if for all x, y ∈ A,
xR1y ↔ xR2y. Two proﬁles R1,R2 ∈ Rn coincide on A ⊆ X if R1i and R2i
coincide on A for all i ∈ N .
The set of admissible proﬁles and/or the set of admissible agendas may
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be restricted a priori. The preference domain is D, a nonempty subset of
Rn. The agenda domain is A, a collection of nonempty subsets of X.
A social choice correspondence C : A×D → X is a mapping that assigns
a nonempty subset of the agenda to each admissible agenda and admissible
proﬁle. The set C(A,R) is the choice set. If for all A ∈ A and all R ∈ D,
C(A,R) contains a single alternative, then C is a social choice function. In
this case, we write x instead of {x} when {x} is the choice set.
In its choice-theoretic formulation, Arrow’s [1] Theorem demonstrates
that the four Arrow social choice correspondence axioms are incompati-
ble when the preference domain is unrestricted (i.e., D = Rn) and every
nonempty subset of X is an admissible agenda. The Arrow axioms are Ar-
row’s Choice Axiom, Independence of Infeasible Alternatives, Weak Pareto,
and Nondictatorship.
Arrow’s Choice Axiom places restrictions on how choices are made out of
diﬀerent agendas for a ﬁxed preference proﬁle.
Arrow’s Choice Axiom. For all A1, A2 ∈ A and all R ∈ D, if A1 ⊆ A2
and C(A2,R) ∩ A1 = ∅, then C(A1,R) = C(A2,R) ∩ A1.
Informally, for a given proﬁle R, if the agenda A1 is a subset of the agenda
A2 and the choice sets for these two agendas have at least one alternative in
common, then the choice set for the smaller agenda consists of that part of
the choice set for the larger agenda that is contained in the smaller agenda.
Independence of Infeasible Alternatives requires the choice set to be in-
dependent of preferences over alternatives not in the agenda.
Independence of Infeasible Alternatives. For allA ∈ A and all R1,R2 ∈
D, if R1 and R2 coincide on A, then C(A,R1) = C(A,R2).
For all A ∈ A and all R ∈ D, the weak Pareto set is
P(A,R) = {x ∈ A | ∃y ∈ A such that yPix for all i ∈ N}.
The Weak Pareto axiom requires the choice set to be a subset of the weak
Pareto set.
Weak Pareto. For all A ∈ A and all R ∈ D, C(A,R) ⊆ P(A,R).
For a nonempty set A ⊆ X and an ordering R ∈ R, the set of best
alternatives in A according to R is
B(A,R) = {x ∈ A | xRy for all y ∈ A}.
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An individual d ∈ N is a dictator for the social choice correspondence C : A×
D → X if C(A,R) ⊆ B(A,Rd) for all A ∈ A and all R ∈ D. That is, d is
a dictator if the choice set is always a subset of d’s best alternatives in the
agenda. Nondictatorship is the requirement that there be no dictator.
Nondictatorship. There is no dictator.
Grether and Plott [5] investigated the consistency of the Arrow axioms
when the only admissible agendas are those subsets of X containing at least
k alternatives, where k < |X|.
k-Set Feasibility. There exists a positive integer k < |X| such that A ∈ A
if and only if |A| ≥ k.
Grether and Plott assumed that the preference domain is unrestricted.
Their theorem is also valid for the domain of linear preference proﬁles, and
it is this version of their theorem that is relevant here.
Unrestricted Linear Preference Domain. D = Ln.
The Grether-Plott Theorem shows that the Arrow axioms are inconsis-
tent with an unrestricted linear preference domain when the agenda domain
satisﬁes k-Set Feasibility.
Theorem 1. (Grether-Plott [5]) There is no social choice correspondence
with an unrestricted linear preference domain that satisﬁes k-Set Feasibil-
ity, Arrow’s Choice Axiom, Independence of Infeasible Alternatives, Weak
Pareto, and Nondictatorship.
3. Strategic candidacy
The framework introduced in the previous section needs to be modiﬁed some-
what in order to describe the Dutta-Jackson-Le Breton [3] model of strategic
candidacy. Let C = {1, . . . ,m} be the set of potential candidates, V be the
set of voters, and N = C ∪ V, where |N | = n. The candidate set C corre-
sponds to the set of alternatives X in the preceding section. We assume that
m ≥ 3 and |V| ≥ 2. We consider both the case in which some candidates are
voters and the case in which they are not. The set C is assumed to be ordered
in such a way that the nonvoting candidates (if any) appear ﬁrst. Let C1 be
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the set of nonvoting candidates and C2 be the set of voting candidates, where
|C1| = m1 and |C2| = m2. Note that V = C2 ∪ (N\C) and m1 + m2 = m.
Both candidates and voters have preferences over candidates. For i ∈ C,
let
Li = {R ∈ L | B(C, R) = {i}}.
Li is the set of linear preferences on C that rank candidate i ﬁrst. Candidate
i is assumed to have a preference in Li. Let LC1 =
∏
i∈C1 Li, LC2 =
∏
i∈C2 Li,
and LC = LC1 ×LC2 . Voters who are not candidates can have any preference
in L. A preference proﬁle is now a vector R = (RC1 ,RC2 ,RN\C), where RC1
is the subproﬁle of nonvoting candidates’ preferences, RC2 is the subproﬁle of
voting candidates’ preferences, and RN\C is the subproﬁle of noncandidates’
preferences. The set of admissible preference proﬁles is L∗ = LC × Ln−m.
Any subset of the set of potential candidates may stand for election, but
only one candidate is elected. Let X denote the set of all nonempty subsets
of C. A voting function is a social choice function V : X × L∗ → C.
Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton require a voting function to satisfy Inde-
pendence of Infeasible Alternatives, modiﬁed in the obvious way to apply to
preference proﬁles in L∗. In this context, Independence of Infeasible Alter-
natives requires the election outcome only to depend on the preferences over
candidates who enter the election.
Independence of Nonvoters’ Preferences requires the outcome of an elec-
tion to only depend on the voters’ preferences.
Independence of Nonvoters’ Preferences. For all A ∈ X , all R1C1 ,R2C1 ∈
LC1 , and all (RC2 ,RN\C) ∈ LC2×Ln−m, V (A, (R1C1 ,RC2 ,RN\C)) = V (A, (R2C1 ,RC2 ,RN\C)).
A voting function satisﬁes Unanimity if candidate j is chosen when all of
the voters agree that j is the best candidate running for oﬃce.
Unanimity. For all A ∈ X and all R ∈ L∗, if B(A,Ri) = {j} for all i ∈ V,
then V (A,R) = j.
Because of the restriction on candidates’ preferences, Unanimity is vacu-
ous if there is more than one voting candidate. When this is the case, it is
more appropriate to use Strong Unanimity instead.
Strong Unanimity. For all A ∈ X and all R ∈ L∗, if B(A,Ri) = {j} for
all i ∈ N\C and B(A\{i}, Ri) = {j} for all i ∈ C2\{j}, then V (A,R) = j.
5
Strong Unanimity requires candidate j to be chosen if j is unanimously
preferred by all voters to all of the other candidates in the election once
each voting candidate’s self preference (other than that of candidate j if j is
a voting candidate) is ignored. If there are no voting candidates, Unanimity
and Strong Unanimity are equivalent.
A voting function is Candidate Stable if each candidate prefers the out-
come when all candidates are on the ballot to the outcome that would obtain
if he or she withdrew from the election.
Candidate Stability. For all i ∈ C and all R ∈ L∗, V (C,R)RiV (C\{i},R).
Strong Candidate Stability requires the election outcome to be unaﬀected
if a candidate withdraws who would lose if every candidate stood for oﬃce.
Strong Candidate Stability. For all i ∈ C and all R ∈ L∗, if V (C,R) = i,
then V (C,R) = V (C\{i},R).
This axiom is a strengthening of Candidate Stability if the set of vot-
ers and candidates overlap. However, when no voter is a candidate, these
conditions are equivalent for a voting function that satisﬁes Independence of
Nonvoters’ Preferences.
Lemma 1. (Dutta-Jackson-Le Breton [3]) If a voting function satisﬁes In-
dependence of Nonvoters’ Preferences and C2 = ∅, then it satisﬁes Candidate
Stability if and only if it satisﬁes Strong Candidate Stability.2
Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton use a strengthened version of the nondic-
tatorship axiom introduced in the preceding section. Let
Am−1 = {A ∈ X | |A| ≥ m− 1}.
A voter d ∈ V is a dictator for large elections for the voting function V : X ×
L∗ → C if V (A,R) = B(A,Rd) for all A ∈ Am−1 and all R ∈ L∗. Informally,
an individual is a dictator for large elections if this individual’s most-preferred
candidate is elected whenever all or all but one of the candidates run for oﬃce.
2We have only stated the part of Lemma 2 in Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton [3]
that deals with Candidate Stability. Their lemma also assumes that the voting function
satisﬁes Independence of Infeasible Alternatives and Unanimity, but these assumptions are
not needed to show the equivalence of Candidate Stability and Strong Candidate Stability.
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Strong Nondictatorship. There is no dictator for large elections.
Theorem 2 is the Dutta-Jackson-Le Breton candidate stability theorem
for the case in which there is no overlap between candidates and voters.
Theorem 2. (Dutta-Jackson-Le Breton [3]) If C2 = ∅, there is no voting
function that satisﬁes Independence of Nonvoters’ Preferences, Independence
of Infeasible Alternatives, Unanimity, Candidate Stability, and Strong Non-
dictatorship.
When candidates can also be voters, Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton have
established the following theorem about voting functions that satisfy Strong
Candidate Stability.
Theorem 3. (Dutta-Jackson-Le Breton [3]) If a voting function satisﬁes
Independence of Nonvoters’ Preferences, Independence of Infeasible Alter-
natives, Strong Unanimity, and Strong Candidate Stability, then there is a
dictator for large elections and the dictator is in V\C.
In view of Lemma 1 and the equivalence between Unanimity and Strong
Unanimity when C2 = ∅, Theorem 2 is a simple corollary to Theorem 3.
Note that when V = C, there does not exist a voting function satisfying the
properties in Theorem 3.
4. A proof of the candidate stability theorem
In this section, we use the Grether-Plott Theorem to help prove Theorem 2.
Throughout this section, we assume that C2 = ∅; i.e., there are no candidates
who are permitted to vote.
We ﬁrst establish a preliminary result concerning social choice correspon-
dences whose agenda domain is Am−1 and whose preference domain is Ln,
where Am−1 is now the set of subsets of X of cardinality at least m− 1. Let
C∗ : Am−1 × Ln → X be such a social choice correspondence.
An analogue to Unanimity for C∗ is Unanimity*, which requires x to be
chosen if it is everyone’s best choice in the agenda.
Unanimity*. For all A ∈ Am−1 and all R ∈ Ln, if B(A,Ri) = {x} for all
i ∈ N , then C∗(A,R) = {x}.
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The following lemma shows that Weak Pareto is implied by Arrow’s
Choice Axiom, Independence of Infeasible Alternatives, and Unanimity* for
a social choice correspondence whose domain is Am−1 × Ln.
Lemma 2. If a social choice correspondence C∗ : Am−1 × Ln → X satisﬁes
Arrow’s Choice Axiom, Independence of Infeasible Alternatives, and Una-
nimity*, then it also satisﬁes Weak Pareto.
Proof. Let C∗ : Am−1 × Ln → X be a social choice correspondence that
satisﬁes Arrow’s Choice Axiom, Independence of Infeasible Alternatives, and
Unanimity*. We have two cases to consider.
Case 1. We ﬁrst show that for any R ∈ Ln, C∗(X,R) is contained in the
weak Pareto set. On the contrary, suppose that there exists an R ∈ Ln and
x, y ∈ X such that xPiy for all i ∈ N , but y ∈ C∗(X,R). Without loss of
generality, we suppose that x = x1 and y = x2.
By Arrow’s Choice Axiom, x2 ∈ C∗(X\{x3},R). Consider a proﬁle of
preferences R1 ∈ Ln that coincides with R on X\{x3} and has x3 ranked last
by all i ∈ N . By Independence of Infeasible Alternatives, x2 ∈ C∗(X\{x3},R1).
It then follows from Arrow’s Choice Axiom that C∗(X,R1) ∩ {x2, x3} = ∅.
Arrow’s Choice Axiom now implies that C∗(X\{x4},R1) ∩ {x2, x3} = ∅.
Consider a proﬁle R2 ∈ Ln that coincides with R1 on X\{x4} and has
x4 ranked last by all i ∈ N . By Independence of Infeasible Alternatives,
C∗(X\{x4},R2) = C∗(X\{x4},R1) and, hence, C∗(X\{x4},R2)∩{x2, x3} =
∅. By Arrow’s Choice Axiom, we then have C∗(X,R2) ∩ {x2, x3, x4} = ∅.
Repeated use of this argument leads to the conclusion that C∗(X,Rm−2)∩
{x2, . . . , xm} = ∅ for some proﬁle Rm−2 ∈ Ln that coincides with R on
{x1, x2} and has x1Pm−2i x3, x2Pm−2i x3, and x3Pm−2i x4Pm−2i · · ·Pm−2i xm for
all i ∈ N . Because x1Pix2 for all i ∈ N , we therefore have x1Pm−2i xj for all
i ∈ N and all j = 2, . . . ,m. Hence, Unanimity* is violated.
Case 2. We now show that for all x ∈ X and all R ∈ Ln, C∗(X\{x},R)
is contained in the weak Pareto set. On the contrary, suppose that there
exist distinct x, y, z ∈ X and R ∈ Ln such that yPiz for all i ∈ N , but
z ∈ C∗(X\{x},R). Consider a proﬁle R1 ∈ Ln that coincides with R on
X\{x} and has x ranked last by all i ∈ N . By Independence of Infeasible
Alternatives, z ∈ C∗(X\{x},R1). By Arrow’s Choice Axiom, C∗(X,R1) ∩
{x, z} = ∅, which contradicts what was established in Case 1 because y
Pareto dominates both x and z in R1. ✷
When C2 = ∅, if a voting function V satisﬁes Independence of Nonvoters’
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Preferences, one can identify V with a social choice function CV with domain
X × Ln−m by setting, for all A ∈ X and all RV ∈ Ln−m,
CV (A,RV) = V (A, (R¯C1 ,RV)),
where R¯C1 is an arbitrary subproﬁle in LC1 .3 Let C¯V : Am−1 ×Ln−m → C be
the restriction of CV to Am−1 × Ln−m.
We now prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2.4 Suppose that C2 = ∅ and the voting function V : X ×
LC1 × Ln−m → C satisﬁes all the assumptions of Theorem 2 except Strong
Nondictatorship. Let C¯V be the social choice function deﬁned above. Because
V satisﬁes Independence of Infeasible Alternatives and Unanimity, C¯V satis-
ﬁes Independence of Infeasible Alternatives and Unanimity*. By Lemma 1,
V satisﬁes Strong Candidate Stability. Because C¯V is a function and V
satisﬁes Independence of Nonvoters’ Preferences, the satisfaction of Strong
Candidate Stability by V is equivalent to the satisfaction of Arrow’s Choice
Axiom by C¯V . Hence, by Lemma 2, C¯V satisﬁes Weak Pareto. C¯V satisﬁes
k-Set Feasibility with k = m − 1. Therefore, by the Grether-Plott Theo-
rem (Theorem 1), C¯V is dictatorial. But C¯V being dictatorial is equivalent
to V having a dictator for large elections. Thus, V does not satisfy Strong
Nondictatorship. ✷
5. A proof of the strong candidate stability theorem
We now consider the possibility that some candidates vote. As in the pre-
ceding section, we identify a voting function V with a social choice function
CV whose preference domain only includes preferences of voters. Because
candidates who vote rank themselves ﬁrst, the preference domain of CV is
restricted. We show that if V satisﬁes the assumptions of Theorem 3, then,
restricted to agendas in Am−1, CV can be extended to the unrestricted linear
preference domain in such a way that all of the assumptions of Lemma 2 are
satisﬁed. The conclusions of Theorem 3 follow relatively straightforwardly
from this observation.
3When C2 = ∅, we write RV instead of RN\C .
4Although Theorem 2 is a corollary to Theorem 3, we provide a separate proof of
Theorem 2 because the direct proof is quite short.
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When C2 is not necessarily empty, the procedure used in Section 4 to
associate a social choice function with a voting function needs to be gener-
alized. Consider an arbitrary R¯C1 ∈ LC1 . If a voting function V satisﬁes
Independence of Nonvoters’ Preferences, one can identify V with a social
choice function CV with domain X × LC2 × Ln−m by setting, for all A ∈ X
and all (RC2 ,RN\C) ∈ LC2 × Ln−m,
CV (A, (RC2 ,RN\C)) = V (A, (R¯C1 ,RC2 ,RN\C)).
Let C¯V : Am−1 ×LC2 ×Ln−m → C be the restriction of CV to Am−1 ×LC2 ×
Ln−m.
We want to extend C¯V to a social choice function C˜V whose domain is
Am−1 × Ln−m1 ; i.e., to a social choice function with an unrestricted linear
preference domain. For any (RC2 ,RN\C) ∈ Ln−m1 , deﬁne (R◦C2 ,R◦N\C) ∈
LC2 × Ln−m as follows:
(i) if i /∈ C2, then R◦i = Ri, and
(ii) if i ∈ C2, then R◦i ∈ Li is such that R◦i coincides with Ri on C\{i}.
Note that (R◦C2 ,R
◦
N\C) is uniquely deﬁned. The social choice function C˜V is
deﬁned by setting, for all A ∈ Am−1 and all (RC2 ,RN\C) ∈ Ln−m1 ,
C˜V (A, (RC2 ,RN\C)) = C¯V (A, (R
◦
C2 ,R
◦
N\C)).
Lemma 3 demonstrates that if a voting function V satisﬁes the assump-
tions of Theorem 3, then the social choice function C˜V satisﬁes the assump-
tions of Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. If a voting function V satisﬁes Independence of Nonvoters’ Pref-
erences, Independence of Infeasible Alternatives, Strong Unanimity, and Strong
Candidate Stability, then the social choice function C˜V satisﬁes Arrow’s
Choice Axiom, Independence of Infeasible Alternatives, and Unanimity*.
Proof. First, we show that C˜V satisﬁes Arrow’s Choice Axiom. Let (RC2 ,RN\C) ∈
Ln−m1 and c ∈ C be such that C˜V (C, (RC2 ,RN\C)) = c. By deﬁnition,
C˜V (C, (RC2 ,RN\C)) = C¯V (C, (R◦C2 ,R◦N\C)) = V (C, (R¯C1 ,R◦C2 ,R◦N\C)). Thus,
V (C, (R¯C1 ,R◦C2 ,R◦N\C)) = c. Strong Candidate Stability then implies that
V (C\{c}, (R¯C1 ,R◦C2 ,R◦N\C)) = V (C, (R¯C1 ,R◦C2 ,R◦N\C)). By deﬁnition, we also
have C˜V (C\{c}, (RC2 ,RN\C)) = C¯V (C\{c}, (R◦C2 ,R◦N\C)) = V (C\{c}, (R¯C1 ,R◦C2 ,R◦N\C)).
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It then follows that C˜V (C\{c}, (RC2 ,RN\C)) = C˜V (C, (RC2 ,RN\C)). Thus,
C˜V satisﬁes Arrow’s Choice Axiom.
Second, we show that C˜V satisﬁes Independence of Infeasible Alterna-
tives. Consider any A ∈ Am−1 and let (RC2 ,RN\C), (R¯C2 , R¯N\C) ∈ Ln−m1
coincide on A. By construction, (R◦C2 ,R
◦
N\C) coincides with (R¯
◦
C2 , R¯
◦
N\C) on
A. Because V satisﬁes Independence of Infeasible Alternatives, we then have
V (A, (R¯C1 ,R
◦
C2 ,R
◦
N\C)) = V (A, (R¯C1 , R¯
◦
C2 , R¯
◦
N\C)). Using the deﬁnitions of
CV and C˜V , it now follows that C˜V (A, (RC2 ,RN\C)) = C˜V (A, (R¯C2 , R¯N\C)),
and, hence, that C˜V satisﬁes Independence of Infeasible Alternatives.
Third, we show that C˜V satisﬁes Unanimity*. Consider any A ∈ Am−1.
Let (RC2 ,RN\C) ∈ Ln−m1 and c ∈ C be such that for all i ∈ V, B(A,Ri) =
{c}. Note that B(A,R◦i ) = {c} for all i ∈ N\C and B(A\{i}, R◦i ) = {c} for
all i ∈ C2\{c}. Because V satisﬁes Strong Unanimity, V (A, (R¯C1 ,R◦C2 ,R◦N\C)) =
c. Using the deﬁnitions of CV and C˜V , we conclude that C˜V (A, (RC2 ,RN\C)) =
c. Thus, C˜V satisﬁes Unanimity*. ✷
Lemmas 2 and 3 are now used to prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose that the voting function V satisﬁes the as-
sumptions of Theorem 3. By Lemmas 2 and 3, the social choice function
C˜V satisﬁes Arrow’s Choice Axiom, Independence of Infeasible Alternatives,
and Weak Pareto. Because C˜V satisﬁes k-Set Feasibility with k = m − 1
and has an unrestricted linear preference domain, C˜V is dictatorial by the
Grether-Plott Theorem. Because C˜V coincides with C¯V on the domain of
C¯V , C¯V is also dictatorial. Hence, there is a dictator for large elections for
V . Strong Unanimity implies that this dictator must belong to V\C. ✷
6. Multivalued voting procedures
In this section, we relate our analysis to the recent articles by Eraslan and
McLennan [4] and Rodr´ıguez-A´lvarez [6] on multivalued voting procedures.5
A voting correspondence is a social choice correspondence V : X×L∗ → C.
Eraslan and McLennan [4] consider the following candidate stability axiom.
Strong Candidate Stability*. For all i ∈ C and all R ∈ L∗, either
V (C,R) = {i} or V (C\{i},R) = V (C,R)\{i}.
5Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton [3] only brieﬂy consider multivalued voting procedures.
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For voting functions, Strong Candidate Stability* is equivalent to Strong
Candidate Stability. Restricted to agendas in Am−1, Strong Candidate Sta-
bility* is equivalent to Arrow’s Choice Axiom.
For a voting correspondence V , we can construct a social choice corre-
spondence C˜V with domain Am−1×Ln−m1 as in the preceding section. With
only trivial changes to the proof, Lemma 3 and, hence, Theorem 3 are valid
for voting correspondences if Strong Candidate Stability* is substituted for
Strong Candidate Stability.6 Eraslan and McLennan have shown that this
theorem can be further strengthened. Their main result shows that, in the
voting correspondence version of Theorem 3, V is characterized by a serial
dictatorship, and this is true even if individuals are permitted to have weak
preference orderings (subject to the proviso that each candidate ranks him-
or herself strictly above the other candidates) and the unanimity condition
is weakened somewhat.7
For the Candidate Stability axiom to apply to voting correspondences,
preferences over candidates need to be extended to preferences over subsets
of candidates. Rodr´ıguez-A´lvarez [6] considers two such extensions based on
the work of Barbera`, Dutta, and Sen [2]. In the ﬁrst of these extensions,
what Rodr´ıguez-A´lvarez calls BDS1, sets of candidates are ordered by their
conditional expected utilities using an initial probability distribution over
the set C and a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function representing the
preference on C. The corresponding multivalued version of Candidate Sta-
bility requires that for any preference proﬁle R ∈ L∗, no candidate i would
prefer to withdraw when the set of candidates is C using any preference over
subsets of candidates that is obtainable from Ri with the BDS1 extension
procedure. Lemma 2 in Rodr´ıguez-A´lvarez [6] demonstrates that if a voting
correspondence V satisﬁes Independence of Nonvoters’ Preferences and Inde-
6We only need to replace C˜V (C, (RC2 ,RN\C)) = c and V (C, (R¯C1 ,R◦C2 ,R◦N\C)) = c
with C˜V (C\{c}, (RC2 ,RN\C)) = ∅ and V (C\{c}, (R¯C1 ,R◦C2 ,R◦N\C)) = ∅, respectively, in
the proof that C˜V satisﬁes Arrow’s Choice Axiom.
7Our proof can be easily adapted to establish the voting correspondence version of
Theorem 3 (using Strong Candidate Stability*) when individuals can have any weak pref-
erence subject to the restriction on candidates’ preferences described above. To apply
our proof strategy, the social choice correspondence C˜V would need to be deﬁned for the
domain Am−1 ×Rn−m1 . For i ∈ C2, the preference R◦i associated with Ri would then be
required to have i as the uniquely best candidate, but would preserve any indiﬀerences
among the other candidates. Note that both the Grether-Plott Theorem and Lemma 2
are valid for the preference domain Rn.
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pendence of Infeasible Alternatives and there are no voting candidates, then
V satisﬁes the multivalued version of Candidate Stability using the BDS1
extension procedure if and only if it satisﬁes Strong Candidate Stability*.
Rodr´ıguez-A´lvarez has also shown that Theorem 2 holds for voting corre-
spondences when Candidate Stability is applied using the BDS1 preference
extension procedure. Using his Lemma 2 instead of Lemma 1, our proof of
Theorem 2 provides an alternative way of establishing his theorem.
References
1. Arrow, K.J.: Social choice and individual values, second edition. New
York: Wiley 1963.
2. Barbera`, S., Dutta, B., Sen, A.: Strategy-proof social choice correspon-
dences. Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.
3. Dutta, B., Jackson, M.O., Le Breton, M.: Strategic candidacy and
voting procedures. Econometrica 69, 1013–1037 (2001).
4. Eraslan, H., McLennan, A.: Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting
procedures. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Finance, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania and Department of Economics, University of Min-
nesota (2001).
5. Grether, D.M., Plott, C.R.: Nonbinary social choice: an impossibility
result. Review of Economic Studies 49, 143–149 (1982).
6. Rodr´ıguez-A´lvarez, C.: Candidate stability and voting procedures. Un-
published manuscript, Departament d’Economia i Histo`ria Econo`mica,
Universitat Auto`noma de Barcelona (2001).
7. Wilson, R.B.: Social choice without the Pareto principle. Journal of
Economic Theory 5, 478–486 (1972).
13
